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Your search for [author]Shavell, Steven returned 10 records. |
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Rewards versus intellectual property rights.
by Shavell, Steven.; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
Subject: Intellectual property -- Econometric models; Incentives in industry -- Econometric models; Reward systems -- Intellectual property righs.
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Threats without binding commitment.
by Shavell, Steven; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.
Subject: Threats -- Mathematical models.
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Economic analysis of law.
by Shavell, Steven, 1946-; New York, NY: Foundation Press, 2004.
Subject: Law and economics.
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Foundations of economic analysis of law.
by Shavell, Steven, 1946-; Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004.
Subject: Law -- Economic aspects.
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The economic theory of public enforcement of law.
by Polinsky, A. Mitchell.; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
Subject: Law enforcement -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models; Sanctions (Law) -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models; Crime prevention -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models; Fines (Penalties) -- Econometric models.
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Any non-individualistic social welfare function violates the Pareto principle.
by Kaplow, Louis.; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
Subject: Social policy -- Econometric models; Welfare economics -- Econometric models.
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Economic analysis of law.
by Kaplow, Louis.; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
Subject: Law and economics; Law -- Economic aspects.
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On the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrence.
by Polinsky, A Mitchell; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997.
Subject: Imprisonment -- Social aspects; Punishment in crime deterrence.
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Corruption and optimal law enforcement.
by Polinsky, A. Mitchell.; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
Subject: Police corruption -- Mathematical models.
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Reconsidering contractual liability and the incentive to reveal information.
by Bebchuk, Lucian Arye.; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
Subject: Contracts; Liability (Law); Disclosure of information.
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